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Abstract
High-speed IPv4 scanners, such as ZMap, now enable rapid and timely collection of TLS certificates and other
security-sensitive parameters. Such large datasets led to the development of the Censys search interface, facilitat-
ing comprehensive analysis of TLS deployments in the wild. Several recent studies analyzed TLS certificates as
deployed in web servers. Beyond public web servers, TLS is deployed in many other Internet-connected devices, at
home and enterprise environments, cyber physical systems, and at network backbones. In Apr. 2017, we reported
the results of a preliminary analysis based on measurement data of TLS deployments in such devices (e.g., routers,
modems, NAS, printers, SCADA, and IoT devices in general) collected in Oct. 2016 using Censys. We also compared
certificates and TLS connection parameters from a security perspective, as found in common devices against top Alexa
sites. Censys has evolved since then and its data volume has increased with the addition of several new device types.
In this paper, we perform a similar but more comprehensive measurement study to assess TLS vulnerabilities in de-
vices, and compare our current results with our 2016 findings, showing how such systems have evolved in the last
one and half year. Indeed, there are noticeable improvements in the TLS ecosystem for devices, especially in terms of
adoption of TLS itself (from 29.4% in 2016 to 73.7% in 2018) and stronger cryptographic primitives. However, we
also note the continuity of significant weaknesses in devices for which immediate remediation is warranted (e.g., the
use of known private keys, SSLv3, MD5-RSA, and RC4). We have also contacted the top manufacturers of vulnerable
devices to convey our findings. Most of them blamed users for not updating their devices with latest firmware images
that apparently would mitigate the reported findings.
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1. Introduction
Beyond user-level computing devices and back-end
servers, there are many other Internet-connected devices
that serve important roles in everyday IT operations.
Such devices include routers, modems, printers, cameras,
SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) con-
trollers, DVR (digital video recorders), HVAC (heating,
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ventilating and air conditioning technology), CPS (cyber
physical systems), and NAS (network-attached storage)
devices. Several past studies have identified critical secu-
rity issues in these devices, including authentication by-
pass, hard-coded passwords and keys, misconfiguration,
serious flaws in their firmware and web interfaces; ex-
ample studies include: [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. The massive
DDoS attack on DynDNS as attributed to the Mirai bot-
net (e.g., [7]), populated by DVRs, IP cameras and other
IoT devices, shows the clear danger of security flaws and
weaknesses in these devices. Antonakakis et al. [7] ar-
gue that the absence of sound security practices in the IoT
Preprint submitted to Elsevier September 30, 2018
space leads to a fragile state of its environment impacted
by vulnerabilities in devices. The Reaper [8] IoT botnet
appears to be more severe than Mirai, as Reaper is capable
of exploiting numerous device vulnerabilities, as opposed
to Mirai’s rather simple albeit effective exploitations of
default credentials; see also [9].
Over the years, manufacturers of networked devices
have implemented some security mechanisms, notably,
the adoption of SSL/TLS for communicating with other
devices. With the help of the ZMap [10] high-speed IPv4
scanner, some recent projects analyzed the TLS ecosys-
tem for web, email and SSH servers, and identified and
measured significant security issues in TLS deployments
in the wild; see e.g., [11, 12, 13, 14].
Heninger et al. [15] highlighted faulty random num-
ber generators in networked devices (see also the recent
follow-up work [16]). Chung et al. [17] analyzed over
80 million invalid TLS certificates, and attribute most
of them to network devices, including modems/home
routers, VPNs, NAS, firewalls, IP cameras and IPTVs.
In Oct. 2016, we studied the state of the TLS ecosystem
for networked devices [18] and found many devices using
cryptographic primitives that are phased out from modern
browsers and web servers.
The types and number of devices available in Censys
have increased since 2016, with significantly more de-
vices supporting TLS (73.7%) compared to 2016 (29.4%).
However, still some devices continue to support weak
crypto primitives, while in few device types, the use of
such primitives has increased. In this work, we evalu-
ate the progress of securing the TLS ecosystem for de-
vices by performing a similar measurement study in a
more comprehensive form and compare the results with
our previous study. We extracted certificates of devices
and Alexa sites, and process the raw data following the
same methodology as in our previous study. There are few
new device types added to Censys since 2016. The num-
ber of Alexa sites is now restricted to Top-1M in Censys.
We analyze certificates and TLS parameters of
6,319,951 devices (out of 8,570,047), collected from Cen-
sys (http://www.censys.io) on May 6, 2018. Unsur-
prisingly, many devices still continue to use cryptographic
primitives that are currently being phased out from mod-
ern browsers and web servers. The state of the TLS
ecosystem doesn’t appear to have gained any significant
progress. Specifically, we found a significant number of
devices using unsafe RSA 512-bit keys (3760 certificates)
and 768-bit keys (8338 certificates), slightly lower than
our findings in Oct. 2016. The vulnerable/deprecated RC4
stream cipher is still widely used in devices (302,038). A
large number of devices (167,900) also use (deprecated)
SSLv3. No traces of SSLv2 are found in the snapshot
taken in May 2018. We also compare TLS security pa-
rameters between devices and Alexa Top-1M sites, which
clearly highlights the differences in these two domains. In
all security aspects that we consider (SSL/TLS version,
signature, encryption and hashing algorithms, and RSA
key length), devices on average are more vulnerable than
Alexa sites.
Similar to our previous study, we communicated our
findings to top manufactures of vulnerable devices. Inter-
estingly, as in our previous study, Cisco appears to have
the highest number of vulnerable devices. Furthermore,
the information of devices (e.g., model/serial numbers)
in Censys with weaker cipher suites is limited, inhibit-
ing us from providing manufacturers concrete identifying
information of these devices. We refrained from carry-
ing out intrusive testing to find more specific information
of these devices to avoid jeopardizing systems in produc-
tion. Overall, we hope our results will serve as a cata-
lyst to quick fixing of TLS issues in devices, so that these
devices do not remain less secure than the HTTPS/web
ecosystem in the long run.
Dataset and code release. Scripts and the steps for
analyzing Censys dataset used in our experiments are
available at: https://madiba.encs.concordia.ca/
software.html. The processed Censys dataset can be
released upon request for non-commercial use with the
consent of Censys maintainers.
Contributions.
• We carried out a measurement study to assess the
vulnerabilities in devices based on their TLS cer-
tificates and protocol parameters. Our current study
is more comprehensive (cf. [18], conducted in Oct.
2016) as new device types and more data relating to
devices are added to Censys since 2016. Although
the rate of adoption of TLS is remarkable for devices
between 2016 and 2018, the use of weak primitives
haven’t reduced significantly. Ironically, the use of
weak primitives has increased in some devices and
vice-versa with strong primitives.
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• We find an increase of devices with ICS protocols
(notably in S7 and Modbus) compared to a study
performed by Mirian et al. [19] in 2016. These
protocols were originally designed to operate within
closed networks without explicit security measures.
Although, Mirian et al. found a similar behavior as
ours, we report the rate of increase of devices sup-
porting these protocols (except for DNP3) is higher
than what they observed in Mar. 2016.
• From our follow-ups with the leading manufac-
turers of vulnerable devices, apparently, security
patches from vendors remain unadopted by many de-
vice owners. Beyond adopting secure updates in a
timely manner, we also briefly discuss a few counter-
measures to improve the security of these devices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
We discuss related work pertaining to TLS deployments
in Section 2. We elaborate our methodology and the de-
vices in focus for our study in Section 3. In Section 4,
we provide the details of our analysis and results in terms
of: the prevalence of weak security practices, and changes
(between 2016 and 2018) in the use of weak and strong
cryptographic primitives for devices; we also compare the
overall results of devices with Alexa-1M HTTPS web-
sites. In Section 5, we present our disclosure procedure
and responses from manufacturers of devices with most
weaknesses. We list limitations of our experiments and
future improvements in Section 6. We suggest a few rec-
ommendations to improve the state of device security in
Section 7, and finally, conclude in Section 8.
2. Related work
We briefly discuss measurement studies on real-world
TLS deployments.
To allow researchers to analyze SSL certificates,
the EFF SSL Observatory project [20] offered the first
large-scale, open certificate repository containing SSL
certificates for the IPv4 address space in 2010. Later, in
2013, Durumeric et al. [11] analyzed the ZMap collected
data of web applications (HTTPS) over a period of 14
months to uncover all public certificate authorities (CAs)
and the certificates they issued. Censys [21] is a search
engine used to query information relating to hosts and
networks stored in daily ZMap scans. As an example
application for Censys, the prevalence of the unau-
thenticated Modbus protocol among SCADA systems
has been studied. Numerous such systems have been
found across the globe. However, non-SCADA devices,
specifically, the TLS ecosystem for those devices have
not been studied. We extend existing work to understand
the TLS ecosystem for networked devices, mostly used
at home, enterprise, and industrial environments, and
physical/network infrastructures.
Heninger et al. [15] reported in 2012 that RSA/DSA
algorithms as used specifically in embedded network
devices are vulnerable due to faulty random number
generators. They found that 0.75% of TLS certificates
share keys, and RSA private keys can be easily calculated
for 0.50% of TLS hosts (also reported similar results for
RSA/DSA keys as used in the SSH protocol). However,
other TLS/certificate parameters were not analyzed in
this study.
Pa et al. [6] propose the IoT honeypot (IoTPOT) to
analyze malware attacks against devices such as home
routers, smart fridges, and other IoT devices. Their hon-
eypot data also shows significant increase in Telnet-based
attacks, including DDoS, against IoT devices. Costin
et al. [4] devise a platform to find possible reuse of
fingerprints of SSL certificates, public/private keys of
devices in ZMap datasets; many devices were found with
reused keys.
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are becoming popular
facilitating the remote and electronic control of physical
equipment and censors. Although these devices with no
in-built security are originally designed to work in closed
environments, in recent years they are connected to build
smart grids. Mirian et al. [19], studied the Internet-
connected vulnerable devices, and found an increase of
devices supporting BACnet, DNP3, Modbus, Fox and S7.
Shodan.io is a search engine similar to Censys, targeted
towards IoT devices (full access requires paid subscrip-
tions). In addition to IPv4 devices, Shodan claimed
to have scanned millions of IPv6 addresses, reportedly
by exploiting a loophole in the NTP Pool Project [22].
Arnaert et al. [23] highlight challenges in aggregating
search results from Shodan and Censys, and propose an
ontology to make them more usable and effective for
finding vulnerable IoT devices.
3
There have several large-scale measurement studies of
vulnerable IoT/CPS devices in the recent years, includ-
ing potentially malicious scanning activities. Galluscio
et al. [24] used an algorithm with data from the dark-
net to infer compromised unsolicited IoT devices. They
found 11,000 such devices, most of which are embedded
into active CPS infrastructures, and can be recruited into
botnets. Leveraging a network telescope (consisting of
unused, new IP ranges), Fachkha et al. [25] studied the
probing of CPS devices supporting 20 common CPS pro-
tocols. They analyzed and correlated 50GB darknet data
for this purpose (from one-month period), and extracted
the probing events after an inferring process. They found
more than 9000 such orchestrated events, attributed to un-
solicited and malicious campaigns. After cross-matching
these events with threat repositories, the authors found
Modbus, ICCP, Niagara Fox and DNP3 are the top abused
TCP CPS. Torabi et al. [26] performed a similar anal-
ysis to infer compromised IoT devices by finding those
devices from the Shodan service, and identifying which
of them are malicious using a threat repository/malware
database. Xu et al. [27] carried out a comprehensive study
of vulnerabilities in IP cameras available at http://www.
insecam.org. In addition to cameras without password
protection, the authors found open ports, network traffic
rate, live video feeds streamed without owner’s knowl-
edge, and outdated/vulnerable software programs. Note
that, unlike these studies, we focus on the weaknesses spe-
cific to TLS deployment of networked devices.
Benson et al. [28] argue the fragility of the device
ecosystem is attributed to unpatchable/insecure devices,
insecure default passwords/misconfigurations, and the
lack of suitable user interface, regulation, and cooper-
ation between IoT manufacturers, network providers,
content providers and end-users. The authors propose
a Security Monitor to observe the aggregate view of
network activity, as the low volume of attack traffic
from an individual device is most likely undetectable. In
addition, they propose a Security Manager to police the
behavior of IoT devices at levels of different granularity
(e.g., IP and service levels).
To improve the manual annotation process in Censys
(the ZTag device tagging module), Feng et al. [29] de-
velop an Acquisitional Rule-based Engine (ARE) capable
of discovering and annotating devices automatically.
ARE relies on application-layer responses from devices
that run an Internet-accessible server, in conjunction
with product information collected through web search.
However, ARE will miss devices behind a NAT or the
ones that cannot be queried from outside (e.g., no web
server). Mi et al. [30] scan residential networks behind
NAT to discover IP proxy machines including home IoT
devices; access to residential machines is purchased from
residential proxy providers such as Luminati1 and Geo-
surf.2 This approach is however ethically questionable
at best (no consent from the device owners). Also, some
proxy providers, such as Luminati disallows scanning the
local network.
3. Methodology and device info
We rely on the Censys [21] search engine for our analy-
sis. In this section, we provide a brief overview of Censys,
and detail our methodology.
Censys3 enables querying data from the Internet-wide
scan repository, a data repository hosting the periodic scan
results as collected by the ZMap scanner [10]. Censys
tags the collected data with security-related properties and
device types, allowing easy but powerful search queries
through its online search interface and REST API. Cen-
sys also tags TLS and certificate data of Alexa Top-1M
web sites. Tagging is done by annotating the raw scan
data with additional metadata, e.g., type and manufac-
turer for devices, and Alexa ranking for sites. The output
from the application scanners is used to identify device-
specific metadata. The annotation process involves ZTag
(paired with ZMap and ZGrab), allowing researchers to
add logic to define metadata for currently untagged de-
vices [21]. Although Censys is now commercialized and
a matured product, search capabilities in Censys are still
improving (not all device metadata is defined in ZTag, al-
though ZTag can be extended). Thus, TLS/certificate data
and tag information for all device types are still not com-
prehensively reflected in Censys.
Table 1 lists available device types extracted from Cen-
sys, divided by their TLS support, for our datasets col-





















Infra. router 237,540 66.8 118,259 33.2 381,379 69.1 170,320 30.9
Modem 158,558 86 25,724 14 108,021 2.1 4,959,267 97.9
Camera 143,721 95.5 6809 4.5 116,691 92.2 9932 7.8
NAS 71,997 56.5 55,503 43.5 186,222 33.6 368,480 66.4
Home/office
router
51,347 66.7 25,667 33.3 211,851 43.9 270,195 56.1
Network 3 0 39,857 100 1,053,091 79.9 265,715 20.1
Printer 10,148 31.3 22,296 68.7 153,147 76.7 46,463 23.3
Scada 24,909 86.8 3773 13.2 23,509 85.9 3860 14.1
CPS 12,820 93.7 868 6.3 11,423 12.3 81,572 87.7
Media 8000 87.9 1102 12.1 3647 2.5 142,293 97.5
Total 719,043 70.6 299,858 29.4 2,248,981 26.3 6,318,097 73.7
Table 1: Type-wise device distribution
refer to our May 2018 dataset, unless otherwise specified.
We further group some device types from Censys for eas-
ier presentation as follows: modem (cable/DSL), printer
(all printer models, print servers), network (generic net-
work devices, network analyzers), SCADA (scada con-
troller, router, gateway, server, frontend), media (set-top
box, digital video recorders, VoIP, cinema), CPS (PLC,
HVAC, IPMI, alarm system, environment monitor, fire
alarm, industrial control system, water flow controller,
light controller, power distribution unit, power monitor,
power controller, solar panel). Certain device types (e.g.,
USB) appear to be small in numbers (9). This may be
due to the fact that the tagging process in Censys is not
very comprehensive. We do not consider devices that are
very low in number or does not fall into our device cate-
gorizations (e.g., KVM, TV tuner, USB devices). The de-
vices appear to come from all around the world (78 coun-
tries with >1000 devices); the top 10 countries host about
84% of all devices compared to 56% reported in our 2016
study. Top-3 countries hosting these devices in 2018 are
USA 43.5%, Mexico 15.8%, Spain 6.3% (in 2016: Ger-
many 17.9%, USA 15.0%, India 4.9%).
For comparison, we chose the Alexa Top-1M sites.
Data extracted from Censys is transformed to an inter-
mediary format that requires a resource-intensive post-
processing phase. Search queries can be executed on Cen-
sys in two ways: a RESTful web API or an SQL interface
engine.4 We used the latter option, as it is more efficient
for large-scale search results. After the TLS parameters
and certificates are extracted for devices and Alexa-1M
sites, we first analyze our selected security parameters and
algorithms in devices. We then compare the security pa-
rameters from devices with those from Alexa-1M sites, to
highlight any important differences between them. Simi-
lar to past work (e.g., [11, 31]), we choose the following
certificate/TLS parameters: cipher suite (algorithms used
for hashing, key encryption, key exchange and authenti-
cation, signature), SSL/TLS protocol version, and RSA
key length.
4. Analysis and results
On May 6, 2018, we used Censys [21] to extract
certificates and TLS parameters from 6,319,951 TLS-
supporting devices (out of a total of 8,570,047 devices),
and from 735,638 HTTPS sites in Alexa Top-1M. The
number of total devices in Censys supporting TLS have
increased by 21 fold since our last measurement study.
Furthermore, new types of devices have been added to
Censys, including: network (switch) and CPS (alarm sys-
tem, environment monitor, fire alarm, IPMI, power con-
4Accessed via Google BigQuery interface: https://bigquery.
cloud.google.com
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troller, solar panel). We also noticed a new type of router:
SOHO (Small Office / Home Office) appearing in the lat-
est Censys snapshot, which we categorize as home/office
router. Only home routers were found in our previous
dataset. Home routers are normally used for personal
use where users prefer accessing the Internet with wifi
connections for ease of accessibility. In contrast SOHO
routers are intended to support enterprise systems, mostly
through wired Ethernet. The count of devices supporting
TLS has increased significantly in May 2018 (6,318,097,
73.7%) compared to Oct. 2016 (299,858, 29.4%); the in-
crease of modems is also extraordinary (i.e., from 25,724
to 4,959,267). In contrast, the percentages of some de-
vices (infrastructure router, printer, network) supporting
TLS have decreased from that in May 2016. This may be
attributed to the variation of the proportion in which de-
vices of different types are added to Censys. In this sec-
tion, we provide the results of our analysis and compare
the use of TLS/certificate parameters.
4.1. Prevalence of weak security practices
For each cryptographic primitive in a device certificate
and TLS/SSL protocol banner, we compute the percent-
age to compare the parameters between devices; see
Figures 1–5 for a comparison of the weak cryptographic
primitives (for exact data, see Table 2). We also compare
average values from devices with Alexa sites (the last two
bars). For brevity, we first highlight results for algorithms
and parameters that are most vulnerable. We also analyze
certificate reuse in both devices and Alexa sites.
Hash functions in message authentication. Some
devices still use MD5 although in small fractions. The
use of MD5 in home/office routers (60,835, 22.5%) and
CPS (14,665, 18%) devices are significant. In Alexa-1M
sites, the MD5 usage is negligible as a percentage (1834,
0.2%) compared to our findings in 2016 (6588, 1.1%).
Media (141,905, 99.7% ) devices and infrastructure
routers (152,601, 89.6%) mostly use SHA1; see Figure 1.
MD5 is broken for more than a decade now [32]. SHA1
collision attacks are now feasible [33] (see also [34];
being phased out as of writing).
Hash functions in signature schemes. The MD5-RSA
signature scheme is mostly used in printers (16,749,
36.1%), while SHA1-RSA is predominant in media
(141,882, 99.7%), network (185,607, 69.9%) devices,
infrastructure routers (152,601, 29.7%) and modems
(3,699,856, 74.6%); see Figure 2. Devices using MD5-
RSA are vulnerable to certificate collision attacks, where
attackers create certificates that collide with arbitrary
prefixes/suffixes [35]. Out of all the modems, the
usage of SHA1-RSA is the highest in wireless modems
(27,747, 75.2%). Some devices (164,847) use “un-
known” algorithms; according to a Censys author (email
correspondence), these algorithms are not parseable.
RSA key lengths. The use of factorable 512-bit RSA
keys is a serious security issue, enabling efficient FREAK
attacks (e.g., via [36]). These keys are mostly observed
in infrastructure routers (3111, 1.9%), cameras (434,
4.4%) and Scada (22, 0.6%) devices. We also noticed
512-bit RSA keys in an industrial control system and
two solar panels. The industrial control system with
the factorable key appears to be located in Spain, and
manufactured by Opto22 [37]. Certificates with 1024-bit
RSA keys are deemed to be insecure as of early 2016; see
NIST SP 800-131A (at least 2048 bits should be used).
However, many devices still use 1024-bit keys (Figure 3);
the use of 1024-bit keys is high in infrastructure routers
(124,918, 78%) and media (141,771, 99.6%) devices. A
few Alexa-1M sites (12,974, 2%) still use 1024-bit RSA
keys in certificates.
Encryption algorithms. We check the use of vulnerable
ciphers such as RC4 (see e.g., [38], RFC 7465), and
3DES (the Sweet32 attack [39]). Note that the ZGrab
application scanner as used with ZMap includes RC4
as a supported cipher (in addition to ciphers included
in the Chrome browser), to allow communication with
older TLS servers. RC4 is mostly used in infrastructure
routers (108,834, 63.9%), while its use is minimum in
media (85, 0.1%) devices; see Figure 4. Alexa-1M sites
still use RC4 at a smaller scale (4828, 0.66%). The
use of 3DES cipher is limited except in CPS (4734,
5.8%) and network (10,392, 3.9%) devices. 3DES is
more prevalent in firewalls (8412, 25.8%). The use
of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (currently being standardized,
RFC 7905) as a replacement of RC4 is still negligible
in devices as an average (550, 0.09%) compared to
Alexa-1M sites (15,225, 2.07%).
TLS/SSL version. SSLv3 usage (vulnerable to the POO-
DLE attack [40]) is considerable in home/office routers



































































Figure 5: SSL/TLS protocol versions
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Hashing alg. Signature alg. RSA keylen Enc. alg. Protocol
MD5 SHA1 MD5-RSA
SHA1-





Infra. router 0.6 89.6 0.2 29.7 1.9 5.2 78 1 63.9 2.6 79.7 0
Modem 0 72.2 1.6 74.6 0 0 66.7 0 1.5 1.2 58.2 8.5
Camera 2 53.7 11.2 65.2 4.4 0 25 0.2 3.9 1.1 45 0.5
NAS 0.1 19.4 2.9 28 0 0 39.1 0 0.3 0.1 17.6 0
HO router 22.5 39.4 26.3 8.7 0 0 35.1 0 22.6 28.3 27.9 0
Network 0.2 72.3 6.6 69.9 0 0 53.5 3.9 13.1 5.1 48.2 0.2
Printer 0 49.4 36.1 43.6 0 0 43.3 0.3 5.4 0 44.1 0.1
Scada 1 72.2 6 40.8 0.6 0 44 0.8 6.1 0.9 48.5 0.5
CPS 18 45.6 5.2 67.3 0 0 73.4 5.8 21.1 17.1 34.3 0
Media 0.1 99.7 0.1 99.7 0 0 99.6 0 0.1 0.1 99.7 0
Device avg. 1.2 68.3 3 65.9 0.1 0.1 64.1 0.27 4.78 2.6 55.4 6.6
Alexa-1M 0.2 18.2 0.3 3.9 0 0 2 0.06 0.66 0 4 0
Table 2: Percentages of weak cryptographic primitives in devices (as of May 6, 2018); under Enc. alg., 3DES and RC4 represent 3DES-EDE-CBC
and RC4-128, respectively. “HO router” in the first column is “home/office router”.
1.0 is vulnerable to the BEAST attack [41]. Media
(141,861, 99.7%) and infrastructure routers (170,311,
79.7%) have a high use of TLS 1.0. However, in Alexa-
1M sites (31, 4%), TLS 1.0 use is low. In our study in
Oct. 2016, we found devices supporting SSLv2 (depre-
cated in 2011, see RFC 6176). Version rollback attacks
downgrade SSLv3 to SSLv2 [42]. With the DROWN
attack [43], an attacker can even break a strong RSA key,
if the server shares the RSA key with an SSLv2 server.
Most of these devices were of type NAS (5517) and
network (2006). However, none of the current snapshots
in ZMap or Censys appear to have devices using SSLv2.
Certificate issuers. Most device certificates are self-
signed (68% and 71% in Oct. 2016 and May 2018,
respectively), potentially making them vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. The remaining cer-
tificates are CA-signed; see Table 3 (total CAs: 1335 and
4923 in Oct. 2016 and May 2018, respectively). Some
CA organizations are device manufacturers, others are
browser trusted. Certificate data in Censys contains a flag
indicating the browser trusted status (based on Mozilla
NSS). According to the Top-10 issuer organizations data
taken from 2016 and 2018 snapshots, a major change
is the adoption of free certificates from Let’s Encrypt
(21,006; no certificates from traditional CAs in top
10). We could not find more details of the “Bitbug.net
Network Services” certificate issuing organization. The
Issuer DN field of certificates issued by “hw” contains
email addresses from Huawei (e.g., HW@huawei.com).
When contacted, Huawei confirmed the issuance of those
certificates. Although “trendchip”5 was acquired by
another company in 2010, certificates issued are still in
use under its former name. Certificates of both trendchip
and Bitbug.net are expired.
Certificate reuse. Some devices often come with the
same default certificate, which remains unchanged
afterwards. We group certificates according to their
SHA256 fingerprints for reuse detection.6 Many devices
reuse certificates, out of which DSL and cable modems
are the highest (4,763,389, 75.4%). These devices may
be vulnerable to MITM attacks (cf. SSH attacks [44]).
Certificates reuse in Alexa sites has reduced slightly
(33% of certificates are reused in May 2018 vs. 38% in
Oct. 2016, mostly due to CDN, similar to past studies,
5https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/
snapshot.asp?privcapId=28942714
6Certificates with the same public key may differ in other fields, re-
sulting in different fingerprints. We did not analyze public key reuse
in certificates; the dataset we use from ZMap/Censys does not contain
actual public key values.
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Oct. 2016 May 2018
Issuer org. Count % Trusted? Issuer org. Count % Trusted?
Western Digital 6846 0.67 × Synology Inc. 143,336 2.27 ×
Synology Inc. 6461 0.63 × hw 138,154 2.19 ×
ZyXEL 4220 0.41 × Huawei 125,009 1.98 ×
GoDaddy.com 1412 0.14 1213 trendchip 37,161 0.59 ×
hw 1101 0.11 × ZTE Corporation 30,841 0.49 ×
TELMEX 1038 0.10 × Let’s Encrypt 22,815 0.36 21,006
TAIWAN-CA 818 0.08 818 LANCOM Systems 15,041 0.24 ×
COMODO 811 0.08 630 Bitbug.net Network Services 11,376 0.18 ×
StartCom Ltd. 628 0.06 399 SANGFOR 9986 0.16 ×
GeoTrust Inc. 622 0.06 538 Cisco Systems 9543 0.15 ×
Table 3: Top 10 organizations issuing device certificates (the “Trusted?” column represents browser trustworthiness)
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Figure 6: Unique certificates: Alexa-1M (total certs: 735,638) vs. devices (6,319,951) as of May 2018
e.g., [45]); see Figure 6. Certificate reused by groups of
5+ Alexa sites/devices are relatively low.
The Common Name (CN) in most reused certificates
contain non-routable IP addresses, e.g., 192.168.1.1
(274,824, 4.35%), generic identification labels, e.g.,
zxserver (138,135), BMS (1,345,520), or domain names,
e.g., *.alarmesomfy.net (14,004).
DH prime number reuse. Many devices supporting
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange reuse prime num-
bers. Such reuse can be exploited via the Logjam attack,
enabling a MITM attacker to downgrade connections
to export grade Diffie-Hellman [14]. Alias et al. [46]
reported that a timing side-channel attack is possible
with DHKE used in an embedded system which can
decrease the key search area, reducing the time to solve
the Discrete Log Hard Problem (DLHP). Such an attack
can lead to the extraction of private keys from devices.
There are (308,139, 4.87%) reused primes in devices,
including infrastructure routers (27,187, 0.43%), NAS
(5479, 0.54%), modems (97,753, 1.55%), and network
(63,443, 1%). In Censys, there are 735,638 Alexa do-
mains supporting TLS, out of which only 3.6% (26,310)
support DHKE reused prime numbers. In Oct. 2016,
0.2% of all Alexa sites reused DH prime numbers, while
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Hashing alg. Signature alg. RSA keylen Enc. alg. Protocol
MD5 SHA1 MD5-RSA
SHA1-





Infra. router 0.4 -9.8 -54.7 -10.6 -1.3 -2.2 -5.2 1 -17.6 -52.4 35.7 -0.2
Modem -0.4 38.8 0.9 -18.8 -0.1 0 59.3 0 -18.4 1 25.8 8.5
Camera -10 -21.2 -1.3 -6.1 3.3 -0.1 -26.5 -0.2 -17.7 -2.6 -21 -11.6
NAS -1 -6.1 -7.4 -19.7 -0.2 0 5.2 -0.2 -2.3 -0.7 -4.2 -0.1
HO router 22.3 -32.5 26 -18.8 0 0 6.9 0 22.3 28.2 2.8 0
Network -0.1 -17.8 4.8 -25 0 -0.4 -36.5 3.6 6.9 4.2 -36.2 0.1
Printer 0 -34.8 -38.8 30.2 0 0 -28.2 -0.6 -18.9 0 -34.2 0.2
Scada -2.7 -11.8 -5.6 -14.6 -1.4 0 -5.1 -1.8 -8.4 -3.2 -19.1 -0.6
CPS 17.7 0.9 1.6 -13.7 -0.7 0 60.5 -13.9 18.3 16.1 14.6 -19.4
Media -15.9 33.5 -12.2 41.8 -0.3 -0.1 48.2 -0.5 -18.9 -15.8 40.1 -0.6
Device avg. -2.6 0.9 -15.3 7.6 -1 -1.9 16.2 -3.23 -14.5 -6.5 5.1 1.8
Alexa-1M -0.9 -13 -0.2 -7.9 0 0 -3.8 -0.2 -1.1 0 -11.6 -0.1
Table 4: Changes in weak cryptographic primitives in devices between Oct. 18, 2016 - May 6, 2018; under Enc. alg., 3DES and RC4 represent
3DES-EDE-CBC and RC4-128, respectively.
with Alexa-1M sites, the same reused percentage is 9.9%
(50,292). Therefore, it appears that DHKE prime number
reuse is significantly high in Alexa-1M sites compared to
all of the Alexa sites.
4.2. Changes in the use of weak cryptographic primitives
New devices added to Censys consist of cryptographic
primitives at varying proportions. These cryptographic
primitives exhibit positive and negative fluctuations at the
level of our device groupings, or when taken as an av-
erage. Table 4 shows changes in percentages of weak
primitives. A negative value represents a reduction of the
primitive compared to our previous study and vice-versa.
Alexa-1M sites supporting HTTPS have increased in Cen-
sys (from 598,888 to 735,638) since 2016. The numbers
for device average of SHA1 hashing algorithm (0.9%),
SHA1-RSA signature algorithm (7.6%), RSA key lengths
of 1024-bit (16.2%), TLS 1.0 (5.1%) and TLS 1.1 (1.8%)
have increased.
It is important to note that even when the average of
a device category for a weak primitive is reduced, it is
still possible to observe an increase of the same primitive
for a specific device in the same grouping. For example,
the use of MD5 on average has reduced (-2.6%), but its
use in home/office router (22.3%) and CPS (17.7%) de-
vices has increased significantly. SHA1 use has increased
in modems (38.8%) and media (33.5%) devices, while
a sharp drop is noticed in home/office routers (-32.5%)
and printers (-34.8%). MD5-RSA use has dropped in in-
frastructure routers (-54.7%) and printers (-38.8%). The
1024-bit RSA keys increased in modem (59.3%), CPS
(60.5%) and media (48.2%) devices. SSLv3 usage has
dropped in infrastructure routers (-52.4%). No change is
observed for Alexa-1M sites (SSLv3 is not used).
Mirian et al. [19] found devices with ICS (Industrial
Control Systems) protocols show vulnerabilities in equip-
ments installed in plants. The number of vulnerable de-
vices for specific ICS protocols (in Mar. 2016) and the
percentage increase between Dec. 2015 – Mar. 2016 is
shown in columns 2 and 4 of Table 5. All devices sup-
porting ICS protocols are tagged in Censys with the spe-
cific protocol name (e.g., BACnet, DNP3, Modbus, Fox,
S7), and we use these tags to differentiate when count-
ing devices supporting each protocol. We extracted the
number of devices supporting the specific protocols from
the May 2018 snapshot in Censys and calculated the per-
centage change from Oct. 2016. The number of devices
using S7 (41.6%) and Modbus (24.9%) protocols have
increased significantly. However, devices using DNP3
(1.2%) haven’t increased much.
Reusable private keys. It appears that a substantial num-
ber of manufacturers include shared private keys into
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Increase from Dec’15 to
Mar’16 [19]
Increase from Mar’16 to
May’18
BACnet 16,813 17,178 0.4% 2.1%
DNP3 429 434 2.3% 1.2%
Modbus 23,120 30,771 7.1% 24.9%
Fox 26,535 28,261 0.9% 6.1%
S7 2798 4791 18.7% 41.6%
Table 5: Changes in vulnerability – an increase in devices supporting vulnerable ICS protocols is apparent with time (specifically for Modbus and
S7)
firmware of devices being sold [47]. These keys are
mostly used to provide SSH and HTTPS access to de-
vices. It is possible to extract these private keys after
buying such devices or from a downloadable firmware.
Censys tags these reused private keys, but it is not an
exhaustive source to find all devices that are impacted.
This is also because not all devices are persistently con-
nected to the Internet. Viehbo¨ck et al. [48] published a
list of fingerprints of devices with known private keys.
Censys identifies these devices with private keys using a
non-intrusive approach leveraging the fingerprints of cer-
tificates from its Internet-wide scans [49]. If a reused
private key is exposed, a large number of devices may
become vulnerable to impersonation, man-in-the-middle
and passive decryption attacks [49]. Top-10 countries
with devices including known private keys are shown
in Table 6. Thailand (14.14%), United States (13.09%)
and Brazil (10.06%) are the top 3 countries that include
known private keys in devices. According to a previous
study [49] carried out in 2015, top 3 countries having de-
vices with known private keys are United States (26.27%),
Mexico(16.52%) and Brazil (8.10%). While the situation
have improved in some countries, in some countries de-
vices with known private keys have increased, e.g., United
Kingdom (3.62%), Brazil (1.96%), Colombia (0.04%).
We summarize the numbers and percentages of devices
with reusable keys in Table 7. Modems, home/office
routers, network and NAS devices appear to reuse a con-
siderable number of these private keys. According to Ta-
ble 8, Huawei, DrayTek and Multitech are manufactur-
ing most of these devices. To mitigate this risk, vendors
should consider assigning a random private key to each
of the devices manufactured. On the other hand, users
should change the default passwords and certificates (self-
Country Count Percentage
Thailand 193,805 14.14%
United States 179,435 13.09%
Brazil 137,803 10.06%
Dominican Republic 132,787 9.69%
Mexico 86,825 6.34%





Table 6: Top-10 countries with known private keys included in devices
signed) pertaining to devices whenever possible as appro-
priate. However, this is not always a pragmatic approach
due to lack of permissions, controls and knowledge to
adopt such security measures by clients.
4.3. Changes in the use of strong cryptographic primi-
tives
The use of strong cryptographic primitives appears to
have reduced for certain devices between Oct. 2016 –
May 2018; see Table 9. The SHA256 usage in modems
(-38.4%), CPS (-18.6%) and media (-17.7%) devices
has dropped significantly. The use of SHA256-RSA
and SHA512-RSA has significantly reduced in media (-
29.7%) and Scada (-8.9%) devices, respectively. Al-
though, the device average of SHA512-RSA has de-
creased slightly (-0.5%), no change is observed in Alexa-
1M sites. Even though, the SHA256-ECDSA use in de-
vice grouping under consideration or device average has
not reduced, the use of same signature algorithm has re-
duced slightly in Alexa-1M sites (-0.4%). The device av-
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Device grouping Count Percentage
Modem 535,530 6.2%





















Allegro Software 6964 0.1%
Table 8: Top-10 manufactures of devices with a known private key as
tagged in Censys
erage for 2048-bit (-13.3%) and 4096-bit (-0.3%) RSA
keys has reduced, but the corresponding change in Alexa-
1M is an increase (12%, 3.1%). The device average
for AES-128-CBC (-2.8%) has reduced, but the stronger
AES-256-CBC (17.55%) and AES-128-GCM (1.21%)
primitive use have increased. In contrast, in Alexa-1M
sites, only the use of AES-128-CBC (-1.8%) and AES-
256-CBC (-9.39%) have reduced. The device average of
TLS 1.2 protocol is slightly reduced (-2.8%) as opposed
to the considerable increase of the same in Alexa-1M sites
(11.6%). Also ,TLS 1.2 use in modems (-35.1%) has re-
duced while it is the opposite for cameras (35.2%).
Overall, apart from encryption algorithms, there is an
increase in weak TLS primitives with the growth of de-
vices supporting TLS. It is likely that the legacy devices
accumulated over time may not get proper attention to
have their firmware upgraded to latest versions to elim-
inate possible vulnerabilities (due to e.g., lack of over-
sight [50]).
5. Disclosure
The vulnerable devices we found in our study are
manufactured by hundreds of different companies. The
Top-5 manufactures of vulnerable devices are show in Ta-
ble 10. We have contacted the ones with many vulnerable
devices, where we could locate contact email addresses
of vulnerability management support teams of these
manufacturing companies from the web, explaining our
findings. We have got responses from Cisco, DrayTek,
Synology, Huawei and Ubiquiti Networks. According
to Cisco, they allow users to import certificates of their
choice, who may be using certificates with weak ciphers
due to lack of awareness. As is in our previous study,
Cisco appears to be the top manufacturer with vulnera-
ble devices. Interestingly, the devices manufactured by
Somfy Systems have the same number (13,897) of cipher-
suites with vulnerable MD5, RC4, SSLv3 and RSA1024
cryptographic primitives. All these devices appear to be
using the same TLS RSA WITH RC4 128 MD5 cipher
suite for negotiation during the SSL/TLS handshake.
As we found, Vigor routers produced by DrayTek are
vulnerable. DreyTek informed us that the vulnerable de-
vices are of older units where the owners haven’t updated
their firmware. Some of these devices support the weak
SSLv3 protocol. According to DrayTek: “SSLv3 is, of
course, deprecated and users should use TLS1.2 which is
supported by all of our current and most recent products”.
Unfortunately, companies of larger scale will take more
time to improve security of devices with their prevailing
change management practices, where the focus on
stability takes precedence over security. They claim most
of their users update the units, but it is challenging to
acquire 100% success due to lack of adherence by users
in turning off older protocols. In May 2018, more than
800,000 DrayTek routers were found to be exploitable by
a DNS reprogramming attack [51], which can eventually
hijack web traffic to reveal personal information.
Huawei claims that they deny access to WAN ports by
default, but some users appear to have customized their
devices by opening the WAN ports, allowing possible
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Infra. router 9.4 -1.2 18.6 1.6 8.8 0.3 1.9 5.4 9.3 16.9
Modem -38.4 18.1 -0.1 0 -58.4 -0.4 -4.7 61.5 -38.5 -35.1
Camera 31.2 15.4 0.1 0 32.1 -0.1 -2 -11.3 31.2 35.2
NAS 7.1 27.2 -0.1 0 -4.5 -0.3 -2.8 -1.8 7 5
HO router 10.2 -7.1 0 0 -6.8 -0.1 26 -58.5 10.2 -31
Network 17.9 12.4 0.1 7.9 36.6 -0.1 11 -39.4 17.8 31.84
Printer 34.8 8.6 0 0 28.2 0 0.2 -15.5 34.8 38.3
Scada 14.63 19 0.7 0.8 6.9 0.3 -6.7 2.3 14.5 22.9
CPS -18.6 21 -8.9 0 -59.3 -0.2 -4.5 18.6 -18.6 -11.3
Media -17.7 -29.7 0 0 -46.8 -0.1 -14.3 51.4 -17.7 -23.7
Device avg. 1.3 4.1 -0.5 0.3 -13.3 -0.3 -2.8 17.55 1.21 -2.8
Alexa-1M 13.9 8.4 0 -0.4 12 3.1 -1.8 -9.39 11.9 11.6
Table 9: Changes in strong cryptographic primitives in devices between Oct. 18, 2016 – May 6, 2018
external attacks. They plan to communicate with their
customers and have the SSH/HTTPS ports of WAN
devices closed, to reduce the risk of devices with known
private keys. Dell claims that the reported devices appear
to run very old firmware, not properly configured or
already out of support. With the latest firmware, they
only use TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.2 protocols,
SHA256 hashing algorithm, longer key lengths (2048
bits), and no RC4 ciphers.
Synology informed us that users may be using outdated
settings to host the services provided by their product(s).
They were very appreciative of our efforts and plans
to publish techniques in enhancing the security of their
Data Security Manager (DSM) with different settings to
address the problem. Ubiquiti Networks informs us that
their airMAX devices used static SSL/TLS certificates
until the end of 2015, at which point they fixed the
problem by generating a self-signed certificate on the first
boot. It appears that users are still using Ubiquiti devices
with old firmware.
6. Limitations
Certain statistics as extracted from Censys appear to be
unusual. For example, there is only one infrastructure
router from certain manufacturers, e.g., Apple, DrayTek
and Huawei. We communicated such observations to a
Censys author, who attributed them to be possible limita-
tions of the current Censys logic, or device misconfigu-
ration. Data in Censys can be queried using the Google
BigQuery SQL interface. This interface allows querying
data using standard SQL and facilitates downloading re-
sults in CSV and JSON formats that are easy to parse and
machine process. However, Google BigQuery is not free
after one year of use.
According to a Censys author, it is possible that some
devices provide conflicting information on different ports,
likely due to port forwarding from specific devices to de-
vice types that are tagged incorrectly. This appears to be
a known issue due to fingerprinting devices at protocol-
level rather than at host-level. Censys plans to work on
a more advanced fingerprinting technique to address this
problem in the future.
Although Censys allows users to search and analyze all
types of connected devices via Google BigQuery, Censys
do not have information of devices that cannot be reached
via ZMap (e.g., private/non-routable/firewalled addresses,
opt-out from ZMap scanning). Furthermore, ZMap do not
scan devices in their blacklist [52] or those network pre-
fixes that fall outside in its whitelist. Therefore, to eval-
uate the completeness of results, correlation with alter-
native sources may be considered [53, 29]. Newer IoT
devices are increasingly adopting IPv6 [54], which also
cannot be measured by the IPv4-based ZMap scanner.
Censys requires manual effort in defining annotation
rules to tag device meta-data (e.g., type, manufacturer),
which is not ideal in discovering new devices at large
scale. Therefore, more collective effort is also needed to
improve device tagging/annotating in Censys [21].
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Manufacturer MD5 RC4 SSLv3 <RSA1024 Device types
Cisco 1340 126,125 50,268 176,478 Infrastructure router, camera, switch, net-
work, SOHO router, firewall, SCADA con-
troller
DrayTek 60,775 60,877 7293 70,801 SOHO router, camera, infra. router
Synology 242 445 211 81,035 DVR, camera, SOHO router, NAS
Somfy Systems 13,897 13,897 13,897 13,897 Alarm system
Dell 760 2541 22 28,592 IPMI, laser printer
Table 10: Top-5 manufactures with vulnerable devices (in May 2018)
We found thousands of vulnerable devices from many
manufacturers, and contacted the top-10 of those with
most vulnerable devices via email (using appropriate ad-
dresses as found in their websites). This is a manual pro-
cess and is not scalable. Stock et al. [55] explore sev-
eral forms of scalable/automated communication chan-
nels (e.g., email, domain WHOIS information, phone, so-
cial media) for more effective vulnerability notification.
7. Recommendations
Based on our analysis, we suggest a few possible way-
out from the current status quo in device security. Note
that these recommendations are preliminary, listed here to
stimulate future work in solving TLS security issues in
non-computer devices.
(1) The obvious one would to enable automatic secu-
rity updates to devices, instead of relying on pro-
active user actions. However, for certain devices
(especially the ones possibly maintained by profes-
sional administrators), care must be taken to avoid
unplanned downtimes of production systems. For
this purpose, vendors should perform thorough test-
ing before releasing patches to its users [56]. In Mar.
2008, a nuclear plant was accidentally rebooted fol-
lowing a software upgrade [57, 58] causing an un-
necessary alarm of a drop of cooling. We strongly
suggest that updating should be used as the last re-
sort for fixing a security issue; it is far better to avoid
possible security issues in the design than fixing them
on-the-go. Also, updates will almost never reach to
100% of all devices. Better understanding the con-
sequences of attacks and designing new attack detec-
tion/resilient algorithms to prevent them at the incep-
tion is vital [57, 58]. As CPS employ autonomous
and real time decision making algorithms, the authors
suggest to have automatic recovery built-in during the
design phase.
(2) As many devices may not be reachable, or not read-
ily update-able due to operational constraints, unlike
desktop/mobile/server computers, we recommend to
adopt strong security measures from the beginning,
including, the use of latest TLS versions, most secure
cipher-suites (given the computational capabilities of
a device). We argue against gradual/step-wise in-
crease of security levels (e.g., from RSA-512 to RSA-
1024) for devices, as they are difficult to update and
may remain operational for years. ICS devices orig-
inally developed to operate on isolated environments
decades ago, still continue to operate, which are now
connected to the public Internet allowing more expo-
sure to possible vulnerabilities [19].
(3) Avoid all known pitfalls in TLS security [59, 60], e.g.,
the use of fixed private keys, vulnerable or soon-to-
be obsolete ciphers (e.g., RC4 and RSA-1024) [61],
and self-signed certificates (can be easily avoided by
using free certificates from Let’s Encrypt).
(4) Although manufacturers may block access to remote
management interfaces of devices over SSH/HTTPS,
users may still customize to allow remote access to
devices. Therefore, it is also prudent for ISPs to en-
sure remote access to customer-provided equipment
(CPE) is disallowed [49].
(5) Allowing insecure device settings (e.g., fixed private
key), or protocols (as in many ICS devices) with the
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assumption that these devices would remain only in
isolated networks must be avoided. Traditionally iso-
lated devices are often being connected to the Inter-
net, e.g., for remote management. Failure to address
the vulnerabilities of interconnected devices in smart
grids will hinder modernization of such systems [62].
(6) Consider system hardening to tighten system secu-
rity by shutting down unnecessary applications and
ports [63].
8. Concluding remarks
As apparent from several studies on the real-world de-
ployment of web servers (e.g., [31, 11]), TLS can pro-
vide tangible security benefit, only when it is configured
properly. Partly due to several recent high-profile mea-
surement studies (e.g., [13, 14]), TLS security for user-
facing servers is improving. However, we found many
networked devices are still using weaker/broken crypto
primitives in TLS, compared to Alexa sites. Based on our
measurement studies carried out in Oct. 2016 and May
2018, although the number of devices supporting TLS has
sharply increased, still a large number of devices support-
ing weaker cryptographic primitives remain vulnerable.
Some manufacturers (e.g., Lenovo, Seagate) appear to
have produced a larger number devices with RC4, MD5,
SSLv3 and key lengths of 1024-bit (RSA) and below. We
also found a considerable number of known private keys
in devices, which make them vulnerable. This is more ap-
parent in modems (6.2%) and home/office routers (1.9%).
Upon reaching out to them, we were told that the primary
reason for the status quo is the inaction of users in ap-
plying latest firmware upgrades. However, the reality is
such that no action is taken by most manufacturers to mit-
igate the vulnerabilities of devices where their users are
not proactive in applying security patches. Blaming users
who haven’t updated their devices with security patches,
which may sometimes happen due to lack of knowledge,
will not solve the issue.
Note that some vulnerabilities may have no effect if the
services are accessed within a local network (e.g., inside a
private home network), or via a modern browser—e.g., no
current browser would accept the RC4 cipher or SSLv2,
even if offered by a server. As these devices are varied
(unlike regular web servers), actual exploitation of their
weaknesses will depend on how they are used/accessed.
These seemingly obsolete attack vectors can also be re-
vived in the presence of a vulnerable TLS proxy between
a modern browser and the vulnerable server, such as an
anti-virus proxy [64].
We hope our findings to raise awareness of this issue
and positively influence the manufactures to push appro-
priate firmware upgrades (possibly with auto-updates).
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